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<A>Introduction 
 
In this chapter we discuss the value of genealogy as a critical method to study 
security. A genealogical method would treat security not simply as an object of 
research, but as something embedded in historical struggles over truth, knowledge, 
authority, expertise and power. This is more complicated than it seems. The aim is to 
avoid assuming that we know what security is. This is especially important today. We 
are witnessing the proliferation of knowledges, practices and technologies that are 
somehow associated with security but that also destabilize the analytical categories 
through which we had come to make sense of ‘security’, such as the internal and the 
external, war and peace, the national and the international, law enforcement and the 
military.  
 
One of the most important lessons from Foucault’s genealogical work is the fallacy 
that supposedly knowledgeable subjects (in this case, us) exist fully formed prior to 
encountering their object of analysis (in this case security), which they then reflect 
upon rationally. A genealogical approach would consider how the discourse of 
security (as a knowledge, discipline, practice) operates as a historical formation, 
constituting both its subjects (its analysts) and object (security ‘itself’). We can 
demonstrate this genealogical observation fairly easily by pointing out that security 
2 
 
analysts are largely shaped and thus constituted by their adherence to disciplinary 
knowledges and assumptions, and by their claim to know what security is. In other 
words, the study of security always risks naturalizing security as an object of study 
and naturalizing the expert subjects who claim such knowledge (see also Chapter 6 in 
this volume).  
 
A genealogical method would be more sceptical about its claim to know security, and 
would be reflexive towards the constitutive effects of security as a discourse. For this 
purpose, it is important to note that the concept of discourse is not reducible to 
language or linguistic entities such as signs or signifiers (Foucault 1972: 27, 100-
109). It also comprises material practices, technological objects and bodily 
procedures. Central to a genealogical analysis of security is an engagement with the 
multiple knowledges and practices that have come to be associated with ‘security’ and 
the mechanisms of subjectivation and objectivation that constitute knowledgeable 
subjects and knowable objects in relation to security. This collection of things, we 
suggest, is best understood not through the unitary term ‘security’, but rather as a 
radically heterogeneous assemblage known as a dispositif in Foucauldian parlance 
Foucault, 1980: s194. 
 
In this chapter, we discuss what it means to adopt a genealogical method for studying 
‘security’ and aspects of it. Conceptually, we distinguish genealogy from ‘mere 
history’ and elaborate it in relation to concepts such as archaeology, dispositif, and 
problematization. In addition, we discuss what it means to use these traditional 
Foucauldian notions in a digital age: how does genealogical work change when the 
principles of archival organization seem to be shifting radically? We relate our 
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methodological intervention to existing works in security studies, which we critique 
from a genealogical perspective. We begin with a discussion of the discipline of 
international relations (IR) for two reasons: first, because security studies has a 
constitutive heritage in IR; and second, because of the powerful insights of earlier 
genealogical critiques of IR itself. In the boxes that complement the argument in the 
running text, we illustrate our methodological claims through reflections on our 
separate research on the police practice of ‘kettling’.  
 
<A>Genealogy and international relations 
 
Within the discipline of international relations (IR), genealogies were first deployed 
to contest the universal presumptions of the epistemic realism that dominated 
international relations theories (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, Ashley and Walker 
1990, Der Derian 1995). Genealogies drew attention to the historical practices 
through which the state, sovereignty and ‘the international’ were constituted 
(Bartelson 1995), including diplomacy (Der Derian 1987, Constantinou 1996), 
foreign policy (Campbell 1998) and security (Der Derian 1993, Dillon 1996). 
Elsewhere in the social sciences, scholars produced genealogies of liberalism (Latham 
1997, Dean 1991, Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1996), freedom (Rose 1999) and 
communication (Mattelart 1996). While Foucault was the biggest influence on this 
research, productive uses of Nietzsche (Bartelson 1995, Elbe 2001, 2002) and 
Deleuze (Molloy 2006) suggest that more varied approaches may yet be articulated. 
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This literature formed part of the ‘critical turn’ in IR and opened up the study of 
international relations to new ways of working and thinking. Partly, this entailed a 
genealogy of the discipline itself (Ashley 1987, Walker 1993). The literature did not 
simply ask how IR was created historically (accounts of which already existed). 
Rather, it questioned how IR was a product of its time and how theories of IR and 
their assumptions were expressions of a particular historically situated spatial and 
political imaginary, and not simply ‘explanations’ of world politics (Walker 1993). In 
genealogical terms, the critical turn posited the historical contingency of IR itself. 
Some traditional accounts of IR had been deliberately ahistorical, such as neorealism, 
but from a genealogical perspective these still had a history and were not ‘timeless’. 
Other accounts, such as that of the English School, offered a version of IR’s historical 
development, but from a genealogical perspective these were a parochial reflection of 
their authors’ contingent historical position. For example, Hedley Bull thought that 
the evolution of the historical origins of the European state system should be the 
starting point for the study of international relations, neglecting the role of 
colonialism in the expansion of global European dominance (Keene 2002). Similarly, 
liberal forms of IR relied on uncritical and often unacknowledged progressive 
philosophies of history, which the genealogical perspective put back in their historical 
place. In short, genealogical approaches to IR questioned the timelessness of 
ahistorical accounts and the contingent parochialism of historical accounts. 
 
IR had always claimed privileged knowledge of security, being primarily state 
security. However, IR came with a lot of baggage. Critical IR scholars drew on 
French theorists (Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Virilio and so on) 
to re-read IR’s founding texts in political theory (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, Kant) in 
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order to critique its basis of knowledge (epistemology) and its units and structures of 
analysis (ontology) (Ashley 1995, Connolly 1988, Walker 1993). They argued against 
the possibility of axiological neutrality, and for interpretivism and reflexivity. They 
stressed the role of ideas, language, discourses and technology in international 
politics. Urging epistemological and ontological pluralism, they favoured multiplicity, 
difference and heterogeneity over unity, identity and homogeneity. This marked a 
rupture with behaviourism, rational choice/game theory and quantitative methods. To 
achieve this, critical IR scholars imported intellectual resources from elsewhere, such 
as poststructuralist philosophy, but also feminism (Shepherd 2008) and postcolonial 
studies (Anghie 2007, Hobson 2004, Jabri 2012). Feminist scholars pointed out 
gendered configurations of the political and onto-epistemological assumptions of IR, 
(Enloe 1990, Sylvester 1994, Tickner 1988). Postcolonial scholars challenged unitary 
western accounts of the international order (Chatterjee, Bhabha, Doty). In so doing, 
they have been a rich source of counter-narratives in and against IR. All this was a 
way of demonstrating the contingent and contested nature of IR.  
 
These critical interventions opened a disciplinary space for a new generation of 
scholars. They did not close down IR, rather through their genealogical critique they 
opened it up for more diverse forms of theoretical and empirical scholarship that were 
not bound by the strictures of orthodoxy. If any one thing unites the work that has 
followed the critical turn, it is a reflexive scepticism towards the disciplinary effects 
of IR itself. However, being itself historically contingent, the critical turn responded 
to the disciplinary problems of its time, and downplayed questions of method. Now 
that there is an established space for critical research, issues of method have become 
more pressing because critical security scholars are increasingly conducting empirical 
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work rather than purely theoretical critique. To understand how research in IR could 
proceed from a genealogical critique of IR we need to revisit genealogy, its meaning, 
its literature, and its implications. Once we have done this, we can consider what 
genealogy means for the contemporary study of security.  
 
<A>Revisiting genealogy 
<B>Genealogy vs. (mere) history 
 
An important starting point for genealogy is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who 
criticized modern historical methodology in his Untimely Meditations (Nietzsche 
1997). In the essay ‘The Uses and Abuses of History’, Nietzsche diagnosed a 
‘historical malady’ afflicting late-nineteenth century Europe. He attributed this 
malady to the efforts of modern history to model itself on science (Nietzsche 1997: 
77). By adopting scientific values such as neutrality and indifference, modern history 
had become obsessed with establishing objective representations of past events and 
epochs. This required the historian to evaluate history from a vantage point somehow 
outside time. Objectivity, Nietzsche argued, presented an impossible ‘ideal’ that only 
served to hide the prejudices and presumptions of the historian. Claims to neutrality 
only served to naturalize the values and presumptions of the present, stifling the 
potential for criticism, creativity and change. 
 
Nietzsche’s critique is rooted in the temporal character of human beings. History is 
not simply something ‘passed’. It is entangled with contemporary forms of life insofar 
as memory informs decisions in the present. History serves life. While history was 
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important, a preoccupation that documented history for its own sake was not simply a 
bizarre prioritization, but a development that stifled innovation and depleted the 
vitality of life and culture in the present. An ‘excessive concern’ with the past was 
eroding the capacity of individuals and nations to live life creatively in the present. 
Nietzsche fashioned genealogy as the antidote to this European historical malady. 
Genealogy asserted that ‘history must itself resolve the problem of history, knowledge 
must turn its sting against itself’ (Nietzsche 1997: 102-3). Genealogy turns to history 
not to construct representations, but to disrupt and undermine them. The temporal 
orientation of genealogy is thus described by Nietzsche as untimely: ‘acting counter to 
our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to 
come’ (Nietzsche 1997: 60). 
 
Genealogy first appears in Nietzsche’s The Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche). This 
sought to make evident the social and historical conditions that gave rise to the 
modern system of Western morality. Moral values are neither timeless nor universal. 
Rather, they have a history: they have evolved through time. As such, moral values 
cannot be located in some transcendent realm. They are produced through social 
interactions over time. More specifically, morals are forged through the unfolding of 
historical contests that play out within contexts defined by particular distributions of 
power. Of course, this conclusion was far from a simple statement of fact. If moral 
values evolved over time, then they were capable of transformation in the future. At 
this point, the critical impact of the genealogical enterprise comes to light: its purpose 
is to undermine naturalized assumptions, reveal the contingent power relations behind 
them, and thus make new forms of freedom, change and creativity possible. In 
Nietzsche, genealogy acts as the blunt instrument through which conditions are 
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fostered for the cultivation of ‘higher values’ and new forms of life (i.e., the 
‘Übermensch’ or ‘overman’). 
 
Morals are as historically contingent as any species of plant or animal.
1
 ‘Contingent’ 
here does not mean random. Species are contingent because there is no inherent 
meaning guiding their evolution. Instead, their development is dependent upon 
contests and struggles marked by differential power relations between those who are 
more or less ‘fit’. In the same way, neither humans nor their morals represent a 
prescribed outcome of the ‘progress’ of history. For the genealogist, history is not 
marked by the march of reason. This makes a radical break with forms of ‘historicist’ 
philosophy that tie together the unfolding of history and the unfolding of thought. 
Following Paul Veyne, we might think of history like the movements of a 
kaleidoscope (Veyne 1997: 167). Instead of linear progress or transcendental laws, the 
‘motor’ of history is rooted in immanent forms of struggle, power and adaptation that 
result in contingent developments. Like Nietzsche, Foucault rejected the humanism 
central to most forms of western reason: ‘What is that fear which makes you seek 
beyond all boundaries, ruptures, shifts and divisions, the great historico-
transcendental destiny of the Occident?’ (Foucault 1972: 209) 
 
In dismissing the existence of laws governing the march of history, the genealogist 
works on a historical field composed of battles too numerous to fully account. This 
complexity undermines the causality assumed in a universal conception of time, in 
which a linear path can be established between ‘what happened’ and ‘what is 
happening’. In genealogy, innumerable quotidian struggles are as important as grand 
battles. Against the method of universal and teleological history, genealogy considers 
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the historical field as too complex to fully represent. As such, genealogy does not 
aspire to representation but to a problematization of historical representation. 
Genealogy emphasizes relations of power and their constitutive role in the formation 
of discourses. Its aim is a ‘history of the present’ that analyzes the lines of descent of 
contemporary perceived problems. It reveals the contingency of contemporary ideas, 
practices and values – otherwise taken as ‘obvious’ or ‘natural’ – by drawing attention 
to their gradual emergence. In so doing it does not ‘search for origins’ but considers 
that processes of historical emergence are multiple, and that the event of emergence is 
a distributed one. Genealogy should not be the writing of histories that validate and 
explain a present understanding or state of affairs as logical and natural, but rather a 
critical intervention that unsettles such histories. As we show in section 3, there is a 
difference between a history of security studies that validates the present state of the 
discipline and a genealogy that exposes the power relations and stakes involved in 
constituting ‘security’ as an object of knowledge to be studied by authoritative, 
knowledgeable subjects. History is contingent because it unfolds through 
interpretative rivalries, circumstance, and to an extent, chance. Genealogy, on the 
other hand, ‘records the history of interpretations’ and emphasizes how discursive 
rules are appropriated and used (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 108). In this sense, 
genealogy is not proper history but a contest over history and an examination of 
contests over history. Genealogy has to ‘identify the accidents, the minute deviations 
– or conversely the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for 
us’ (Foucault 1984b, 81). It must become ‘able to recognize the events of history, its 
jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats’ (Foucault 1984b: 
80). Genealogists work at systematically documenting the historical emergence and 
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descent of those things that, ‘we tend to feel (Barad) without history’ (Foucault 
1984b: 76). It will seek out discontinuities where others found continuous 
development…find recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 106). After Nietzsche’s ‘wirkliche Historie’, Foucault 
also called this genealogical practice an ‘effective history’ (Foucault 1984b: 87-88; 
Dean 1994). By ‘introducing discontinuities into our very being’ (Foucault 1984b: 
88), this ‘effective history’ calls into question the received narratives and associated 
lessons learned from history to reveal the contingency of the present. It shows that 
things did not have to be this way and that they could be otherwise. Genealogy aims 
to open up the field of action in the present. It critically destabilizes the given order 
and questions its conditions of acceptability. For example, in undermining the 
naturalized claim that IR was the ‘scientific’ study of the state system, feminist IR 
scholars exposed the gendered assumptions of international thought, delegitimizing its 
claims to authoritative knowledge and helping to put gender issues on the 
international agenda, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on 
women, peace and security (see Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011 for a critical reading). 
 
<B>Archaeology vs genealogy? 
 
Genealogy depends on other concepts that Foucault developed. Its relationship with 
these other concepts is important for understanding its significance and operation as a 
method. In subsequent sections we will discuss concepts such as problematization and 
dispositif, but first we need explore the relationship between genealogy and 
archaeology. Archaeology is the most discursive aspect of Foucault’s methodological 
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work. It is a study of knowledge using a particular mode of discourse analysis that 
Foucault articulated most explicitly in The Archaeology of Knowledge(1969). It is the 
study of how knowledge has developed over time. Like genealogy, it posits the 
historical contingency of truths and the entanglements of power and knowledge. 
However, it does so by making explicit the epistemic regimes of intelligibility and the 
immanent rules of discursive formation that govern specific fields of knowledge. 
Archaeology has influenced the development of discourse analysis in IR and the 
social sciences generally (e.g., Hansen 2006, Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000, 
Shapiro 1990, Wodak 2009). Archaeology and genealogy do not represent opposing 
methodologies, stages or periods in Foucault's work, but differences of emphasis. 
However, the distinction between them is important. The reasons why Foucault 
moved away from archaeology demonstrate what is at stake in the genealogical 
method.  
 
Faced with widespread criticism that accompanied the publication of The Order of 
Things in 1966 and The Archaeology of knowledge in 1969, Foucault realized that he 
could not justify a detached archaeological position from which to analyze the rules of 
discourse (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 103). Rather, the analyst is always already 
enmeshed in historical power relations and thus can only operate from within them. 
Genealogy can be understood as a response to this challenge posed to the 
archaeological method. It embraces this immanence by making power relations 
central to its method. This is significant because while we must appreciate how 
genealogy is related to forms of discourse analysis, it can never be a detached ‘social 
scientific’ method as some of those analyses have become. Genealogy is always 
immanent to struggles and self-consciously political.  
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Against those who, like Dreyfus and Rabinow, overplay the difference between 
archaeology and genealogy we consider that there is a difference between the two 
methods, but not a strict separation. The aims of genealogy were already at play in 
Foucault’s early (archaeological) propositions (Potte-Bonneville 2004). This can be 
seen in The Birth of the Clinic, published in 1963: the book traces the historical 
formation of a particular form of medical vision linked to a bodily redistribution of 
symptoms of illness and the emergence of the institutional space of the clinic 
(Foucault 1994). Similarly, archaeology continues into genealogy, as Foucault 
himself suggested at the beginning of Society Must be Defended (Foucault 2003). 
Therefore, a methodological account of genealogy requires a solid understanding of 
archaeology. 
 
Foucault’s archaeological method ventured that knowledge was governed by 
‘historical a prioris’. These historical a prioris comprise systems of rules which 
Foucault termed the ‘archive’. For Foucault, the archive has a more specific meaning 
than a collection of historical documents. The archive is not simply data. For 
Foucault, ‘[t]he archive is the law of what can be said, the system that governs the 
appearance of statements (énoncés) as unique events’ (Foucault 1972). In other 
words, the archive governs discourse. It determines how statements (énoncés) make 
sense, which have authority, and which come to be authorized as ‘true’ within a given 
historical setting. To draw an analogy, we might say that the archive governs 
discourse as grammar governs a sentence. When we speak, we do not consciously 
recognize that our speech is governed by a system of rules called ‘grammar’? Yet, , 
we may speak very well and still nonetheless find it difficult to describe these rules 
13 
 
and how they work. However, the fact that these rules are in no way ‘natural’ 
becomes evident when one studies a foreign language or if one reads Shakespeare. 
Grammatical rules shift over time and across language systems. They are contingent. 
Likewise the ‘rules’ which comprise the archive shift over time. As such, they form 
historical a prioris. These systems of rules are neither obvious nor easy to articulate.  
 
Studying these historical rules is different from studying the meaning of particular 
concepts (as in semantics or Reinhardt Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte), the internal 
rules of language (as in linguistics) or systems of signs (as in semiotics). For example, 
an archaeological understanding of Darwin is not a critique of his arguments 
(Foucault 2002a: 143). Neither is it a study of the ‘grammar’ of his scientific 
propositions, nor the logical structure of his arguments. Neither is it an analysis of 
some kind of teleological process of scientific progress in a linear succession of ideas 
traced between subsequent authors (Foucault 2002a: 144). Rather, it is an historical 
analysis of the complex discursive space that links different authors, and not 
necessarily with their awareness: 
 
so many authors who know or do not know one another, criticise one another, 
invalidate one another, pillage one another, meet without knowing it and 
obstinately intersect their unique discourse in a web of which they are not the 
masters, of which they cannot see the whole, and of whose breadth they have a 
very inadequate idea.  
(Foucault 2002a, 143) 
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Archaeology is a method which tries to make this ‘system of rules’, the archive, 
explicit. It aims to show how the rules which govern what can and cannot be said at 
any historical moment have changed over time. As a system that is historically 
specific and never universal, the archive provides a way of understanding the 
emergence of regimes of knowledge in specific contexts. The historical emphasis 
means understanding the conditions of possibility under which regimes of knowledge 
appeared, and not simply their content or logic. These ‘rules’ are diverse and local 
and cannot be reduced to a single set, system or structure. They only multiply the 
more one looks: ‘Far from being that which unifies everything that has been said in 
the great confused murmur of a discourse…[the archive] is that which differentiates 
discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration. 
(Foucault 1972: 129)  
 
Let us now translate this into method. Never assuming an essential truth or origin to a 
concept such as madness (Foucault 1988b) or sovereignty (Foucault 2003, 2007), 
Foucault approached his object of study epiphenomenally. Rather than taking their 
existence as a given, he tried to make sense of them as problems whose evolution can 
be traced though the mass of historical documents and statements that appear around 
them. Although we may never uncover the ‘truth’ of madness or security through 
historical enquiry, we may come to see how their ‘truth’ came to be understood 
historically, at different times and in different places. Archaeology works to unearth 
historically contingent truths through their archival traces.  
 
From this archaeological work, genealogy is employed as a tactic to bring historical 
research into play against existing ‘regimes of truth’. It shows how power relations 
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influence the development of the archive, and the role of knowledge in orienting, 
conditioning and legitimating the exercise of power. Genealogy depends on the work 
done by archaeology, but does not stop with a detached analysis of the historical 
emergence of discursive formations. It goes further by questioning the role of power 
in constituting not only discursive formations, but also subject positions (e.g., the 
‘scientist’, the ‘economist’), authorities (e.g., scientific and economic institutions), 
modes of being (e.g., new types of corporeal shaping of soldiers or workers), social 
changes (e.g., reorganizations of urban architecture and governmental technologies) 
and political struggles (e.g., the protagonists, winners and losers, such as the ‘Third 
Estate’ winning over the French aristocracy as Foucault describes in his lectures on 
how ‘Society Must be Defended’ (Foucault 2002b, Neal 2004). With its emphasis on 
power, genealogy is more explicitly political than archaeology. 
 
Together, archaeology and genealogy ‘write against truth’ (Dean 2003). By 
investigating the ‘regimes of truth’ that are in play in a particular episode, the method 
is to unveil the way ‘truths’ are naturalized and imposed. The method is to question 
the complex mechanisms by which a ‘particular truth’ becomes ‘the truth’. This is 
reflected in Foucault’s interest in problems rather than solutions. The aim of making a 
history of ‘problems’ is to understand how a given object (e.g., madness or security) 
is constituted as a problematic object under particular circumstances. This is why 
genealogy can be understood as an ‘art of problematizations,’ as we will explore in 
the next section. 
 
With all this in mind, the lesson is that genealogical method depends on the patient 
historical work of archaeology, but it can never be a neutral historical analysis. Its 
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historical accuracy remains open to challenge, but accuracy is not the main purpose of 
genealogy (Biebricher 2008: 370). Its aim is not to make its own claim to power-free 
historical truth, but to expose the role of power struggles in constituting that truth. 
Genealogy is the immanent, historical and critical exploration of power relations and 
their constitutive effects. It exposes the historical contingency, struggles, victors and 
vanquished inherent in regimes of truth, thus challenging received historical wisdom. 
In this sense, the method of genealogy is not to write ‘history’ but rather to intervene 
into history from within history.  
 
<TEXT BOX> 
The Emergence of kettling 
‘Kettling’ is an unofficial label for a controversial police tactic that has been deployed 
with increased frequency as a means of preventing the disorder and violence that have 
accompanied some public demonstrations. The aim of kettling is to encircle protesters 
and contain them in a tight cordon (the ‘kettle’) from which they are prevented from 
leaving for several hours. It received considerable media attention in the UK when it 
was used to police student protests in London in the winter of 2010-11. 
 
Kettling appeared to us to be a good topic for genealogical analysis for two reasons. 
First, it appealed to our interest in technologies of power because it represented a 
governmental technology of police. Second, it was clear that kettling had a history in 
specific struggles. It was a site of political contestation: over its legal status, human 
rights concerns, its ‘proportionate’ deployment, and even over the meaning and origin 
of the term itself. We could trace the emergence of this technique in relation to the 
challenges to policing posed by new forms of protest that were more mobile and 
17 
 
disruptive, and more recently enabled by new communication technologies. This 
problem was evident in, for example, the 1990 UK Poll Tax riots and the 2001 WTO 
protests in Seattle. We could also see that the controversy over kettling itself had a 
history, emerging in response to the use of kettling in the 2001 May Day 
demonstrations in London. 
 
Most significantly, what drew our attention to kettling was a recognition of its 
historical singularity (kettling as an ‘event’). In fact, the term ‘kettling’ itself is highly 
contested, reflecting the contemporary problematization of this technique. As our 
research showed, the relatively recent uptake of this term was politically constituted 
in the struggle over the legitimacy of the police practice. For example, under 
parliamentary questioning, the British police disavowed the term ‘kettling’ in favour 
of ‘containment’. As a practice, however termed, kettling caught our attention insofar 
as it deviated from the strategic logic historically deployed in the management of 
crowds, but was also a novel transformation of existing police tactics. In contrast to 
traditional police practices of crowd dispersal (such as the use of water cannons, 
baton charges, cavalry charges, tear gas or the police formation of the ‘flying 
wedge’), kettling operated through a logic of containment. And although the police 
have used various forms of containment as at tactic for many years, keeping a crowd 
contained for many hours rather than for short term tactical reasons seemed to be 
something different. Kettling was not simply a historically divergent practice – one 
that emerged at a specific point in time to address a particular problem – but 
suggested a new logic of policing crowds. 
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Our genealogical research sought to trace the conditions under which the historical 
emergence of kettling was made possible. It was not simply a history of kettling, even 
if some empirical historical work was necessary to understand the historical and 
political significance of the practice beyond the immediate controversy. Rather, it was 
an analysis of the power struggles and interpretive rivalries through which ‘kettling’ 
emerged as a problematization. Our questions were: what is the governmental 
rationality supporting the tactic of kettling? How does it differ from previous 
governmental rationalities? How and when did this practice emerge? What is its 
descent? What is the problematic it seeks to address? How does this relate to the way 
in which security, public order and the crowd are understood? On what conditions is 
kettling itself being problematized?  
</TEXT BOX> 
 
<A>The elements of a genealogy 
<B>Problematization 
 
Our example of kettling shows how genealogy does not focus on discrete research 
objects but rather on the power relations and struggles surrounding them. Again, the 
premise is that there is no neutral analytical standpoint from which to conduct 
analysis, and that the researcher and research object are always already enmeshed in 
historical power relations and interpretive rivalries. This section explores the concept 
of ‘problematization’ in order to clarify the relationship between genealogy and its 
sites of intervention.  
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Foucault developed the concept of problematization relatively late in his work. The 
term appears in the introduction to the second volume of his history of sexuality 
(Foucault 1985b, 11), but also in some of his interviews (Foucault 1983, 1984a, 1997) 
and lecture courses (Foucault 1985a) from the early 1980s. Despite this late and 
somehow peripheral appearance, ‘problematization’ is important for at least two 
reasons. First, Foucault uses it to clarify the methodological premises of his work on 
the ‘politics of truth’ (Foucault and Lotringer 2007, Gros 2002). Simply put, the 
concept provides an answer to questions of what is being analyzed and how the 
objects of analysis are being looked at. Second, the term has implications for the 
critical capacities of the genealogical enterprise. It indicates that no scholar stands 
isolated from their object of study, but is involved in ongoing processes of re-
problematization. 
 
Problematizations are historical incidents that animate genealogical analysis. 
According to Foucault (Foucault 1985a: 65), one has to inquire ‘how...certain 
things...became a problem.’ How, for example, have certain forms of behaviour been 
problematized as madness or crime? In what way, and with what consequences? 
Analogous to these Foucauldian cases, Nikolas Rose has linked the proliferation of 
advanced liberal modes of governance to a problematization of 'the social' as the 
historical referent of liberal governance (Rose 1996). By rendering a particular form 
of ‘the social’ problematic, the statement intervenes in a political debate on solidarity, 
freedom and responsibilities in order to promote new policies for forging different 
kinds of social organization. Designating particular phenomena as problems, in other 
words, is always a crucial step in turning them into governable entities. Genealogical 
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analysis focuses on such decisive moments when forms of behaviours, entities or 
phenomena that for a long time appeared to be self-evident suddenly become 
problematic. Such moments mark dynamic thresholds at which new entities (such as 
madness or delinquency in the eighteenth century) and new political technologies 
(such as neo-liberal policies of individual responsibilization in the late twentieth 
century) emerge. The genealogist traces such moments of appearance and 
disappearance together with the re-configuration of power relations that accompanies 
them. For example, recent genealogical work in security studies has focused on how 
resilience has emerged as a response to the problematization of security brought on by 
the radical contingency of contemporary threat (Walker and Cooper 2011). 
 
By focusing on historical events of problematization, Foucault also sought to resolve 
a particular misunderstanding that had haunted the reception of his work since he 
once provocatively declared that ‘madness does not exist’: 
 
For when I say that I am studying the ‘problematization’ of madness, crime or 
sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of such phenomena. On the 
contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the 
world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment. (...) For I 
think there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the 
process of problematization.  
(Foucault and Pearson 2001, 171)  
 
However, Foucault’s insistence on the reality of phenomena should not be mistaken 
for a return to a brute ‘realism’ that posits the existence of self-evident facts:  
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A problematization does not mean the representation of a pre-existing object, 
nor the creation through discourse of an object that does not exist. It is the set 
of discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the 
play of true and false, and constitutes it as an object of thought (whether under 
the form of moral reflection, scientific knowledge, political analysis etc.)  
(Foucault 1988a: 257) 
 
Problematizations intervene into that which is taken for granted. They are productive 
by inserting objects into a ‘politics of truth’, thereby formatting objects in a particular 
way. Delinquency, in this respect, does not ‘exist’ independently, but is brought into 
‘existence’ by problematizations of behaviours in terms of crime. It enters the play of 
true and false through correctional schemes and criminological theories, panoptical 
laboratories and reformist discourses.  
 
In this sense, problematizations are related to sets of practices, ‘through which being 
offers itself to be, necessarily, thought’ (Foucault 1985b: 11). Acts of 
problematization put into question the unreflected practices and related rationalities 
through which we orient ourselves in the world. They open up a space for thought in 
which a practice can be modified or replaced: 
 
Thought is that which permits a certain distance from a manner of acting or 
reacting, that which makes it possible to make that manner of acting into an 
object of reflection and to make it available for analysis of its meanings, its 
conditions and its goals. Thinking is the freedom one has in relation to what 
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one does, the movement through which one detaches oneself as an object and 
reflects on all this as a problem.  
(Foucault quoted in Rabinow 2003: 46-47) 
 
An historical problematization is a particular kind of event: an event that brings an 
object, a concept or a practice to thought. This is why genealogy does not transcend 
the problematizations it analyzes, but confronts them immanently. Tracing the 
historical thresholds at which phenomena become problematic and are articulated as 
part of reconfigured relations of force is itself an act of problematization (Castel 1994: 
237-252). Problematization therefore designates both the critical mode of activity of 
the genealogist and its object of study. Both aspects feed into each other: unearthing 
the transformations of power that take place when certain behaviours, phenomena or 
objects are being rendered problematic is a way of rendering these transformations 
problematic. For example, genealogical work on resilience in security studies is 
simultaneously an analysis of the problematization of security that traces the historical 
emergence of the concept of resilience in governmental rationales and practices, and a 
further problematization of resilience as a security strategy, that emphasizes its 
political implications and attendant power struggles.  
 
In this sense, genealogy constitutes a reflexive art of problematization. As a critical 
enterprise, it starts with questions of our present, and operates on the past in order to 
trace out the hidden struggles that contributed to the present, thereby denaturalizing 
the taken-for-granted system that works as a regime of truth. This art of 
problematization is critical because it aims to open up the range of possibilities for 
thinking and acting, and thus is associated with freedom. As Thomas Biebricher 
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argues, this freedom is not necessarily emancipatory in the traditional sense of 
‘liberation from power, oppression or exploitation in general’ (Biebricher 2008: 368), 
but it does allow for a reconsideration of one’s world and one’s place within it. This is 
the critical politics involved in genealogical research.  
 
<TEXT BOX> 
Problematizing kettling 
The notion of problematization, outlined above, has informed our genealogical 
analysis in three important ways. First, it was the current problematization of kettling 
within political discourses that drew our attention and encouraged us to choose it as a 
case study. Clearly, the practice of kettling did not emerge from nowhere. It has been 
developed and deployed for some time. Nor was this the first time ‘kettling’ had met 
with criticism or resistance. However, for many reasons (which we were curious to 
investigate) the use of the ‘kettle’ during the 2010/11 UK student protests generated a 
heated debate regarding its legitimacy in policing public protests. We could say the 
process of problematization raised ‘kettling’ to the level of public awareness by 
rendering it as a site of contestation and struggle between politicians, activists, 
experts, commentators and police. This was our point of departure. We were 
interested in how kettling became a problem. 
 
Second, problematizations acted as referents within our genealogical analysis. Our 
genealogy was oriented towards historical problematizations as events. 
Methodologically, it sought first to identify a series of problematization events in 
relation to which ‘kettling’ emerged as a solution. Our aim was not to be exhaustive 
(an impossible task) but to isolate a few of the major events impacting the 
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development of kettling as a practice, such as the UK Poll Tax riots in 1990 and the 
May Day riots of 1999 and 2000. Analysis would then seek to make explicit the 
particular character of these problematizations. What was at stake? Who was 
involved? What responses were advocated? What resources (intellectual, material, or 
otherwise) did they draw upon? In asking these questions, we investigated how 
contests over problems and their possible solutions played out historically. How did 
problems identified in one episode of protest lead to the development and deployment 
of new police tactics in future events? Genealogy works with historical raw material 
to create a partial map of this emergence, such as government documents, news items, 
and contemporaneous commentaries. The emergence of kettling could then be 
situated in relation to these events and the power relations that played out through 
them.  
 
Finally, as genealogists, we recognized the political stakes involved with studying 
kettling at this time. We were not content to investigate these questions in a detached 
manner, but were looking to carry on this momentum. We wanted to intervene in this 
debate and contribute to the contestation of this practice. Remember, to conduct 
genealogical work is to intervene. As such, problematization was not simply our 
starting point but our objective. We sought to augment the processes of 
problematization that preceded our own work by performing genealogical work on 
kettling. This meant exposing the power struggles that took place not only on the 
streets in sites of kettling themselves, but in the historical emergence of the practice. 
</TEXT BOX> 
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<A>Dispositifs and strategy 
 
With genealogy taking shape as a decidedly interventionist and political perspective 
on history, the notion of strategy takes a new dimension in Foucault’s work. Strategy 
is a central aspect of a concept, the dispositif, he forged in the second half of the 
1970s. Both Deleuze (1992b) and Agamben (2009) note that the concept of 
‘dispositif’ – which has somewhat confusingly been translated into English as 
apparatus, deployment, dispositive and ‘set up’ – (Bussolini 2010, Veyne 2010) 
appears at a particular point in Foucault’s thought where he placed greater emphasis 
on the materiality and relationality of power/knowledge (see also Paltrinieri 2012: 
236-244; Rabinow 2003: 49-55; and Chapter 3 in this volume). 
 
In an interview subsequently published under the title ‘Confessions of the Flesh’ 
(Foucault 1980) Foucault was asked to elaborate on this concept. The dispositif, 
Foucault explains, is a ‘formation which has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need’ (Foucault 1980: 195, emphasis in 
original). This formation is constituted by a heterogeneous assemblage of elements: 
‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid’. (Foucault 1980). The 
dispositif, Foucault clarifies, is more specifically ‘the system of relations (réseau) one 
can establish between these heterogeneous elements.’ (Foucault 1980). The 
dispositif is not the individual elements themselves but the particular arrangement or 
configuration of relations that exists between them. They cohere around the ‘urgent 
needs’ entailed by problematizations. For example, as we show in the next box, the 
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‘kettle’ itself is one element in a dispositif of crowd control or security that includes 
the police, historical knowledges of past demonstrations, architectures, laws, and 
communication technologies. 
 
As responses to an ‘urgent need’, dispositifs are formed through the adoption, 
adaptation and bundling together of existing knowledges, practices and technologies. 
In short, the ‘coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus 
(dispositif) of knowledge-power’ (Foucault 2008: 19). Because they are composed in 
a spirit of bricolage – the assemblage of a myriad of existing ‘tools’ designed to 
address different, often unrelated, problems – it becomes impossible to define an ideal 
origin for any dispositif. A dispositif is not a coherent episteme or paradigm built 
around clear principles or concepts; what defines a dispositif is not intellectual 
coherence but a strategic coherence – without relying on the foundational subject of a 
strategist, of course. For example, the dispositif of surveillance problematized by 
revelations about the NSA, GCHQ, the Prism programme, and associations with other 
communications companies and social networking technologies does not have its sole 
origins in 9/11, but it has certainly been driven by a perceived ‘strategic need’ 
prompted by the hyper-problematization of security after 9/11. However, we cannot 
attribute the dispositif of surveillance solely to ‘strategists’, such as particular US 
presidents or heads of security agencies. This dispositif coheres around a strategic 
need that has grown with contingent and organic complexity. A genealogy of 
surveillance would need to reassemble the disparate and relational elements of this 
surveillance dispositif through the genealogical dimensions of history and power.  
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It is especially in its strategic orientation that the dispositif can help us to understand 
and analyze power as a distributed and mobile network of force relations: ‘The 
function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate 
terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections 
between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the 
contradictory’ (Foucault 2008). Foucault explains that the dispositif is: ‘essentially of 
a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation 
of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, 
stabilising them, utilising them, etc.’ (Foucault 1980). Dispositifs involve material 
forms that institute strategic relations of force and epistemic relations of knowledge. 
As such, Agamben sums up a dispositif as, ‘a set of strategies of the relations of 
forces supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge’ (Agamben 2009). 
With Foucault, dispositifs are the techno-material articulation of discursive regimes of 
intelligibility. For example, ‘security’ is both a discursive idea and a concrete 
architecture. Thus, dispositifs crisscross the division between ideational meaning and 
substantial matter (Barad 2007: 132; see also Chapter 3 in this volume). They are 
material infrastructures for power/knowledge. They orient relations of force and 
relations of knowledge in space and over time. The consolidation of practices into 
dispositifs is thus dependent upon a strategy of ‘relaying, connecting, converging and 
prolonging’ (Deleuze 1988). 
 
On the one hand, the dispositif functions as a configuration bearing upon forces to 
direct or conduct them. On the other hand, it provides a conceptual apparatus for the 
genealogist to analyze this evolving contest. In that sense, as a methodological device 
for reassembling diverse elements, the dispositif is what ‘operationalizes’ the method 
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(Bonditti 2012). The genealogist isolates the intelligibility of a practice together with 
its ‘strategies of relations of forces supporting types of knowledge and inversely’ 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 121). He does so not by trying to uncover some kind of 
hidden motive (e.g., of a strategist), but by making explicit the multiple constitutive 
lines of evolution that have actualized the dispositif as a contingent assemblage 
(Deleuze 1992b). 
 
For the genealogist, the value of thinking some things, such as sexuality or security, in 
terms of a dispositif helps sustain a genealogical perspective by looking at them as 
deprived of fixed essence and as having been cobbled together historically. Isolating a 
dispositif within different historical frames reveals a different composition of 
elements and forces aligned to a different purpose. For example, the articulation of 
‘security’ or ‘sexuality’ mutates over time through the historical play of forces. In this 
respect, Deleuze’s interpretation of the dispositif helps clarify the relationship 
between the dispositif and the archive that, strangely, Foucault’s never did: 
‘Dispositifs form our environment. We belong to them, and act in them’ (Deleuze 
1992a: 162). It thereby enables us to diagnose who we are, through the excavation of 
the archive, while also being attentive to what is in the making. For example, 
genealogical research on the surveillance dispositif is not only about the disparate 
material and discursive architecture of security technologies, but also what it means to 
be an individual in the present. It means questioning the nature of privacy, freedom, 
association and expression in an age when our personal and social lives are 
increasingly embedded in networked technologies that turn out to be not at all 
‘secure’.  
 
29 
 
Not only does the question of the strategic nature of the dispositif matter, but also 
important is how to exploit the potentials immanent to them. Dispostifs are not fixed 
and rigid regimes of domination that require revolutionary subversion. They are 
immanent networks that shape the subject and contain the potential for resistance. As 
we will see in the next box, dispositifs do not emerge out of nowhere, but are 
produced in the strategic to-and-fro of forces attempting to out-do each other through 
new innovations in their practice, such as protestors and the police.  
 
<TEXT BOX> 
Kettling and security dispositif 
We studied kettling as a technique of police. Recognizing the historical singularity of 
the kettle, particularly the logic of containment it enacted, we became interested in 
studying kettling as a means of investigating contemporary transformations within a 
wider security dispositif (Foucault). With regard to its strategic aspect, it is important 
to recognize that this technique co-exists and is most often exercised simultaneously 
with other policing techniques including surveillance, police escorts and designated 
protest routes. Accordingly, strategy – understood as an 'art of combinations' – was an 
important concept in both orienting and organizing our work. It helped us to 
understand kettling as one technique within a wider assemblage of social order 
policing. Identifying the conditions under which kettling could emerge as a technique 
of police entailed directing our attention to recent realignments of force relations in 
the contested field of (in)security.  
 
The historical emergence of kettling thus has to take into account the context of 
struggles in which it was assembled. Kettling met an ‘urgent need’: the need to 
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respond to the problem of ‘disruptive protest’ that explicitly aimed to disrupt 
circulations underpinning urban life as a means of raising attention to a cause. We 
were interested in how this style of protest developed by weaving new technologies 
and forms of social networking into tactics of evasion and manoeuvre over the course 
of a series of historical events including the 1990 Poll Tax Riots in London, the 1999 
WTO protests in Seattle, 1999/2000 May Day riots in London among others. 
Disruptive protest, in other words, was itself a strategy assembled over time. 
Disruptive protest problematized traditional methods of crowd control based on 
crowd dispersal. Moreover, in doing so it prompted the development and adoption of 
kettling as a new technique of public order policing, which we could identify in 
historical policing literature (Waddington 1992, 2007). 
 
Thus kettling emerged as a technique in a context of transformations in the power 
relations between protest and public order policing. On the one hand, we were 
interested in understanding how kettling emerged as a combination and adaptation of 
existing technologies of discipline and control. Here we traced the development of 
kettling to containment tactics derived from the battlefield, the harnessing of real-time 
telecommunications by military and police and the remote monitoring of crowd 
movements. On the other hand, we used the notion of strategy to organize our own 
research. Working collaboratively, we worked not just to identify important 
documents and events but to establish links between heterogeneous elements: 
legislation, expert reflections on crowd control, developments in military tactics, the 
development and adaptation of communications technologies. In particular, we were 
interested in investigating how these relations were (historically) constituted and how 
they changed over time. This required taking quite a broad scope when collecting 
31 
 
primary and secondary documents. Accounting for the historical emergence of 
kettling entailed understanding how this mobile field of power relations acted as a 
condition of possibility for the emergence of kettling.  
</TEXT BOX> 
 
<A>Genealogy and the study of security (studies) 
 
This section applies the difference between history and genealogy to security studies 
itself. It discusses how histories of the discipline work to validate disciplinary 
authority in relation to security as a research object, rather than exploring the 
historical contingency and heterogeneity of problematizations of security in order to 
problematize security further.  
 
Genealogies of IRhave  successfully posited the historical contingency and 
constitutive functions of the very concept of the ‘international’. It is not yet clear that 
security studies has undergone a similar challenge. The genealogy of IR showed that 
IR scholars did not rationally and dispassionately reflect upon their object of study 
(the ‘international’) as they claimed. Rather, they helped constitute the ‘international’ 
as an object, and were constituted as knowledgeable subjects through their relation to 
that object. This in turn had the effect of constituting the discipline of IR as a social 
science (Hoffmann 1977), and also played a wider role in naturalizing the otherwise 
historically contingent set of political arrangements represented by the international 
state system. Genealogies of IR, though not always named as such, unpacked how 
concepts such as the international (Der Derian 1995), sovereignty (Bartelson 1995, 
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Walker 1993), realism (Molloy 2006) or the territorial state (Agnew 1994) became 
elements in a regime of truth that regulated what could be said to be ‘international’ 
and what could not. For example, Cynthia Enloe’s work showed how the diplomat’s 
actions were considered ‘international practice’, but not those of his wife or his 
servants (Enloe 1990: 94-123). Following the methodology of Foucault, the 
genealogical counter-narrative to IR in effect said ‘Let’s suppose that “the 
international” does not exist’: ‘If we suppose that it does not exist, then what can 
history make of the different events and practices which are apparently organized 
around something that is supposed to be “the international”?’ (paraphrasing Foucault 
2008: 3; see also Chapter 6 in this book). In this section, we argue that this 
genealogical move has yet to be fully played out in security studies.  
 
Security studies is today becoming a discipline in its own right. It has a constitutive 
heritage in IR, and also in peace and conflict studies. International relations had from 
its disciplinary inception claimed a privileged knowledge of security as state security. 
This knowledge was also supported by what was known as ‘strategic studies’. And 
within security studies, critical security studies has emerged as a critique of this 
orthodoxy. These disciplinary developments have been important, productive and 
constitutive of a new generation of scholars (new knowledgeable subjects). However, 
these developments have come to be told as a history, not a genealogy. Instead of 
genealogical counter-narratives, security studies is still dominated by histories of 
itself (e.g., Buzan and Hansen 2009, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). As discussed 
earlier, the contrast between a history and a genealogy is important and instructive. 
The dominant and well-rehearsed history of the origins and development of security 
studies does not deepen its own contingency, struggles and power relations, but 
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validates it as a discipline. Such a history is about refining theories, concepts, cases 
and indeed methods for studying security. From a genealogical perspective, this 
history contributes to establishing security studies as an authoritative social scientific 
discipline and constitutes its practitioners as knowledgeable (and disciplined) 
subjects. 
  
A genealogy of security studies would not write the history of security studies, but 
would investigate its historical contingency, struggles and constitutive effects (Shah 
2010). In so doing, it would posit security as a corollary of power struggles, not 
simply a research object. By exposing the historical contingency of ‘security’, 
genealogy would further problematize its meanings and effects, whether construed as 
a universal human need, a timeless anchor of the international system of states, or a 
discrete research object for a scholarly discipline.  
 
Take, for example, Buzan and Hansen’s The Evolution of International Security 
Studies (2009), which retells the constitutive disciplinary account given at the 
beginning of the ‘Copenhagen School’s’ Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Traditionally, this story says, IR and security studies were about states. Traditionalists 
considered security to be exclusively a matter of states and military force. ‘Wideners’ 
and ‘deepeners’ then challenged this orthodoxy on empirical and conceptual grounds, 
especially after the loss of Cold War certainties. They argued that security threats 
could take a variety of non-military forms (such as insurance) performed by a wide 
range of security actors (including international institutions, private military 
companies and NGOs) and expanded the scope of security referents (to areas 
including the environment and social identity). For example, Ken Booth (2005), 
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Richard Wyn Jones (2005), Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1997) offered a 
conception of security based on the individual, now commonly known as ‘human 
security’. One empirical expression of this is the 1994 UN Development Programme 
definition of human security, which added personal security, food, health and 
community to the range of already existing ‘security objects’. In the 1990s, these 
perspectives were understood as critical because their conception of security broke 
with tradition. They no longer posed the state as the condition of security. Rather, the 
state was reconceptualized as a possible source of threat and producer of insecurity. 
This move de-equated the state and security, contra the IR orthodoxy. However, the 
‘history’ of security studies stalls this critical project. Instead of rendering ‘security’ 
as the contingent product of historical power struggles and problematizations, it 
works to refine the disciplinary and scientific authority of ‘security studies’ in its 
scholarly relationship to ‘security’ as a research object.  
 
In a related example, Ole Wæver’s ‘securitization theory’ posited security as a 
‘grammar’ in which language and speech acts constitute a process of ‘securitization’. 
Krause argues that through this move, the ‘why’ question (‘why do states go at war’ 
for example) is substituted by the ‘how’ question (‘how are security threats defined’) 
(Krause 2003). This promised to undermine the core object of security studies by 
positing security as nothing other than a contingent construction. However, rather 
than undermine the very basis of the discipline by rendering its conditions of 
possibility as contingent (as the critical turn had done with IR), Wæver and his 
‘Copenhagen School’ colleagues chose to work with the ‘traditional meaning’ of 
security (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998: 4). This meant that they held on to a core 
meaning of security inherited from the orthodoxy: security was about existential 
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threats, entailed ‘exceptional’ means, and usually involved the state (Ciută 2009, 
Opitz 2011). While not necessarily fixing this ‘grammar of security’ as timeless and 
essential (although that is open to interpretation), they pragmatically kept it as a 
historical fact or de facto truth. The proposed research programme, which has been 
enthusiastically taken up by a subsequent generation of scholars, has continually 
refined itself, its theories, and its cases. In contrast to this account of disciplinary 
history, a genealogical perspective would show how this has not only been about 
refining approaches to a research object, but also about constituting new forms of 
disciplinary authority and power. While some have reflected on how security analysis 
itself risks contributing to the social construction of security (Huysmans 2002), few 
have considered how ‘security’ constructs the analyst, their expertise and their 
discipline (see Chapter 6 on ‘Distance’). Without rendering ‘security’ contingent, and 
without fully questioning their own disciplinary constitution in relation to this 
assumed ‘object’, histories of security studies fall short of a genealogy.  
 
The genealogist should not simply refine security as an object of research, but throw 
security, its historical contingency and constitutive effects more radically into 
question. Genealogical research in security studies would ask what can we make of all 
these discourses, practices, knowledges that exist in relation to ‘security’. This means 
taking security as an element in historically-situated problematizations, not simply as 
a research object. The aim must be to proceed empirically without assuming that 
‘security’ exists as an already constituted (or constructed, but de facto) problem, but 
rather as a contingent element in diverse problematizations.  
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Genealogy as critical security method should displace security as a privileged object 
by performing historical empirical work on more heterogeneous dispositifs that relate 
to security but are not necessarily built around it as a foundational problematization. 
This would deepen the problematization of security by undermining it as a core 
research object. For example, recent works in security studies have employed 
genealogical methods to investigate catastrophes (Aradau and Munster 2011, Opitz 
and Tellmann), civil defence (Collier and Lakoff 2008a), critical infrastructure 
(Collier and Lakoff 2008b), terrorism and counter-terrorism (Bonditti 2013), finance 
(Goede 2005), insurance (Lobo-Guerrero 2012), and resilience (Walker and Cooper 
2011, Zebrowski 2013). 
 
<A>Genealogy in a digital age  
 
This section explores the implications of the digitization of ‘the archive’ for 
genealogical research. This complicates genealogical work while, at the same time, 
opening new possibilities for intervention. We can sum this up in two points. First, the 
digital archive represents new forms of archival rules in an archaeological sense. 
Second, the socially networked nature of much of the digital archive has implications 
for the political interventionism of genealogical work, particularly through online 
collaboration as a form of force multiplication and acceleration.  
 
In addition to the imagery of battle, Foucault cultivated an image of genealogical 
work as a solitary trawling of dusty archives. He opens his essay ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History’, as follows: ‘Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently 
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documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on 
documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times’ (Foucault 1984b, 
76). Digitization challenges this image in three ways. First, the archive is no longer 
‘dusty’ but increasingly electronic. For example, the Google Books Library Project 
aims ‘to create a comprehensive, searchable, virtual card catalogue of all books in all 
languages’ (Google 2012). Second, technology offers unprecedented opportunities for 
research collaboration, making genealogy a less solitary pursuit. Third, technology 
offers the possibility of an acceleration of research, in terms of speedy information-
gathering from diverse sources, rapid mobilization of collaborative work around 
pressing political concerns, and swift (digital) publication processes circumventing 
traditional print production times. 
 
Digitization also raises questions about archival ‘rules’, interpretive rivalries, and 
struggles in power/knowledge: how does digitization affect access to the kinds of 
books and documents scholars engage with? Which documents get digitized and 
which do not? Which are made accessible and which are not? What is prioritized and 
why? How do we value particular documents in a time of mass digitization? How 
does digitization impact on the daily conduct of research and, more specifically, on 
archaeological and genealogical research? How far does it help to put Foucauldian 
genealogy in motion?  
 
The digital re-composition of ‘the archive’ is no smooth re-composition. Just as 
Foucault suggested that, ‘[w]e must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to 
things’ (Foucault 1972: 229), digitization is a violence done to discourse. Just like the 
formation of archival ‘rules’ in the archaeological sense, digitization is not a 
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politically neutral process. It entails new forms of struggle, and new relations of force. 
As with every kind of memory, the digital archive has its own combinations of 
remembering and forgetting. Digital genealogy requires an awareness of how the 
digital renders visible and conceals at the same time. Coinciding with the 
opportunities for accessibility, traceability, analysis and accumulation of archival 
documents by their digitization and online availability, the digital archive generates 
new forms of redundancy that are mechanisms of oblivion. This complicates 
archaeological and genealogical research, and makes them a more pressing necessity. 
 
Digitization makes Foucault’s characterization of the raw material of genealogy more 
relevant than ever; the digital archive is indeed a ‘field of entangled and confused 
parchments on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times’ 
(Foucault 1984b: 76). It consists of different layers, from the surface web that is 
easily accessible through a simple Google search; through deeper layers that do not 
show up on Google (whether by design or as a result of ranking algorithms) which 
require more specialized or knowledgeable means of access (e.g., using the electronic 
Hansard parliamentary archive); to the 'deep' or 'dark' web (Harrison 2010) which is 
not indexed by search engines and may include private sources, unlinked pages and 
content generated dynamically. Beyond this surface level archive, the 'deeper' web 
thus requires more specialized skills or technologies to access. Finding ways to 
excavate this may reveal research material overlooked by other researchers and has 
big implications for genealogical research and investigative journalism. The highly 
politicized activities of Wikileaks are a prime example.  
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Digitization offers an opportunity for new forms of genealogical interventionism 
through collaboration. It makes possible the rapid, tactical mobilization of groups of 
researchers around politicized issues. This might mean challenging and undermining 
official accounts of events, crowd-sourced analysis of large bodies of data, or creating 
innovative data visualizations to convey new perspectives on drone strikes or Iraq war 
causalities. Such genealogical products have the potential to ‘go viral’ on social 
media, increasing their political impact.  
 
Digitization is therefore broader than simply rendering documents into a digital form 
and creating online archives. It also involves the development of research computing 
tools. Applications such as the file sharing service Dropbox offer the possibility to 
share part or the entirety of the research corpus, facilitating collaborative research on 
a shared material by scholars located in different parts of the world. In other words, it 
enables transnational collaborative archival research, possibly transnational 
collaborative genealogies. In this respect, technology blurs the physical and practical 
distinctions between the places and tools of research, writing, collaborating and 
communicating. Skype, social networking, Wikipedia and its offspring are built on 
models of collective use of information and collaborative interaction. Wikipedia, for 
example, has become an invaluable starting point for research, although its academic 
use often upsets rarefied scholarly sensibilities. It provides open access information 
and links that otherwise may not be found. Sometimes this is from sources more 
closely involved in the problematizations than would be found in more distanced 
academic sources (e.g., activists). The Wikipedia model also shows how digitization 
can offer greater possibilities for traceability: not just documenting changes made to a 
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document (what, when and by whom?) but also providing a forum for discussing and 
justifying these changes.  
 
Digitization cannot, however, be exclusively understood as a beneficial ‘force 
multiplier’. These computing tools help to build a new kind of world of instantaneity, 
simultaneity, and synchronicity, which, as pointed out by Paul Virilio (1999), has 
multiple and largely unthought implications. If digitization helps gather quantities of 
documents at speed, it is not always clear what to do with that overwhelming mass of 
documents. Search tools that allow the scholar to navigate a document via keywords 
exacerbate the tendency to ‘cherry-pick’ sections of a document or book without 
paying attention to its context. Similarly, collaborative wiki-like online pages have a 
homogenizing role. If they can contribute to an ‘insurrection of subjugated 
knowledges’ (Foucault 2003) and ‘erase the author’, they can also ‘smooth’ that 
knowledge, which is then widely disseminated through the web. One also has to keep 
in mind the growing instability of the digital archive, which exists in a process of 
being constantly overwritten. The dissenting views, bifurcations and impure origins 
that are so important to genealogy may drop out of sight. The ‘gray, meticulous, and 
patiently documentary’ (Foucault 1984b: 76) aspects of genealogy should not be 
neglected. 
 
<TEXT BOX> 
Kettling: genealogical research in the digital archive 
 
Transnational digital collaboration was essential to our genealogical work on kettling. 
Reassembling the dispositif of kettling in its international and historical dimensions 
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required multiple languages, depths of local historical knowledge (e.g., relating to the 
history of protest in different countries), and our combined perspectives on specific 
political contexts and institutions. This section describes the steps of our process.  
 
In order to investigate our questions on kettling, we first needed to assemble a 
research corpus that would help us to understand the various lines of argument and 
opinion (i.e., the ‘discourse’) surrounding kettling. For this phase of research, we 
drew heavily on open source materials on the Internet. We browsed different kinds of 
digital sources relating primarily to UK discussions of kettling, but extended our 
focus to Germany when we found instances of German kettling that preceded its use 
in the UK. While trying to gather and select documents, questions arose about our 
selection criteria and where we should look. Drawing on Deleuze’s comments about 
Foucault’s archival work (Deleuze 1988), we first selected a set of ‘primary sources’ 
gathered from around the ‘focal point of power’. Our own research backgrounds in 
policing and security issues led us to look specifically at parliamentary debates, media 
reports and open-source government and police documents. 
 
The following sources were openly available in the digital archive, though some were 
more accessible than others: news reports about kettling incidents, pictures of kettling 
incidents, entries on Wikipedia on kettling and on the policing of protest in general, 
parliamentary debates and hearings, statements of police experts, statements 
criticizing kettling incidents from human rights organizations and protest groups 
affected by kettling, critical blogs, court rulings after kettling incidents, statements of 
political actors, and official reviews of police practice. These sources were not just a 
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range of scholarly opinions on a topic, but a series of elements in a contested terrain 
of power/knowledge that cohered around the problematization of kettling. 
 
We took a broad approach to the collection of these materials. That being said, there 
was also a danger of collecting too much – a challenge for the individual researcher 
exacerbated by the curiosity of our own research team. Rather than seeking to 
establish an exhaustive list of materials (another impossible task), our criteria for 
selection was based on our own sense of their importance: a) as key elements of the 
discourses surrounding kettling (e.g., Home Office papers, press statements by human 
rights organizations); b) the extent to which they reflected prominent lines of 
argumentation (e.g., newspaper editorials/stories); c) the extent to which they 
provided insight into the processes of problematization surrounding the kettle. 
Following Foucault, we placed a higher priority on the regularity of statements 
(documents which were referenced repeatedly in other documents, lines of argument 
which were repeated by different actors) rather than on seeking to identify the first 
appearance of a particular statement or idea. 
 
We ran a series of searches on keywords including ‘kettling’, ‘police tactic’, 
‘containment’, ‘crowd control’, ‘demonstration’, ‘riot’ and ‘protest’. Nonetheless, it 
quickly became clear from our weekly Skype discussions that this method of 
conducting research was already narrowing the research scope by assuming too much 
about ‘kettling’. What were the conditions for example, which made it possible for 
‘kettling’, and not another technique, to emerge as the appropriate way of dealing 
with the problem of demonstrations? We thus broadened our scope: we attempted to 
open the research horizon by running searches on ‘social order’, ‘social disorder’ and 
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‘psychology of crowds’, and by pursuing references found within the texts we had 
gathered. Here, the collaborative dynamic played an important role in compiling 
research materials. Harnessing the international distribution of our group allowed us 
to trace the migration and mutation of practices and discourses across borders. This 
could have escaped any of us working individually. 
 
The knowledge we generated collaboratively drew out the connections between 
various documents, ideas and discourses. By assisting, encouraging and working off 
the ideas of each other we could construct these connections to a degree that 
superseded the sum of our parts (that is if each researcher had been working 
individually). In terms of the depth of our analysis and the speed at which our analysis 
progressed, our collaborative structure substantially benefited our genealogical 
analysis. 
</TEXT BOX> 
 
<A>Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have explored the value of genealogy as a critical security method. 
We began by explaining the achievements of the genealogical move in the ‘critical 
turn’ in IR in the last two decades. This created disciplinary space for new kinds of 
research not bound by orthodoxy. Most genealogical works in IR were theoretical and 
historical, taking the form of conceptual histories of the present. Instead of searching 
for the historical origins of the ‘international’, they inquired into how the history of 
‘the international’ and its related concepts had been written with the effect of 
constituting the (quite recent) discipline of IR itself. The effect of these genealogies 
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was to problematize and render contingent the discipline, the ‘scientific’ claims of its 
analysts, and the supposed ontological neutrality of its objects and concepts. 
  
We took this as our starting point but have gone further. While genealogy is a method 
rooted in an approach to history, it need not only be a way of ‘doing’ history. One 
does not have to write a historical ‘genealogy of’ a particular object, concept or 
practice to make use of genealogical method. History is the raw material of 
genealogy, not its aim. Its method is to identify and intervene in historical 
problematizations. It asks certain questions. What ‘strategic need’ did 
problematizations respond to? What and who came to be reorganized around them? 
What struggles were involved? As the example of our ‘kettling’ research shows, 
genealogy and its related concepts can be used to identify current problematizations 
and situate them in a formation of historical lines of descent, subjective struggles, and 
recombinations of techniques and technologies, all of which have constitutive effects. 
  
Genealogy identifies problematizations and problematizes them further. Its archives 
are not data; they are power/knowledge relations. Its problematizations are not 
‘objects’ for dispassionate reflection; they are sites of struggle. Its dispositifs are not 
arrangements to be defined, described and delimited, but heterogeneous assemblages 
posited by the genealogist to further problematize such definitions, descriptions and 
delimitations. 
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1
 While evolution provides a convenient metaphor for discussing contingency, Nietzsche’s (and 
Foucault’s) relationship to Darwinian evolution is, of course, more complicated (for a discussion see 
Ansell-Pearson, 1997; Grosz, 2004; Sarasin 2009). 
